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COVENTRY PATMORE’S CORPUS
BY EWAN JONES
In the pure theater that is Robert Buchanan’s Fleshly School, 
Coventry Patmore does not merit so much as a walk-on part. Matthew 
Arnold plays Horatio to Alfred Tennyson’s Hamlet; A. C. Swinburne 
and William Morris are Rosencranz and Guildenstern; even Robert 
Bulwer-Lytton gets to be “a Gentleman.”1 That Patmore is nowhere 
to be seen hardly counts as a great surprise, given that his general 
reputation, by the time of Buchanan’s review of 1871, was about as far 
from fleshliness as it was possible to get. For the representative mid-
Victorian reader, Patmore was above all the Patmore of The Angel of the 
House (1854–62), his extended verse apotheosis of sober matrimonial 
bliss. The association has, more or less, stuck: with the caveats that 
where the Victorian public reveled in Patmore’s epithalamion, more 
contemporary readers tend to find it disconcertingly patriarchal; and 
that where the Victorian public devoured it in drones, today’s audience 
rarely give it the time of day.
Those areas of the academy that have recently reconsidered 
Patmore’s work generally confirm the sense that here stands before 
us the most unfleshly of poets. In the past years, Patmore has become 
an avatar of abstract, idealizing or immaterial conceptions of verse 
(and of life). Meredith Martin’s The Rise and Fall of Meter asserts 
that “his metrical grid was abstract”; Yopie Prins similarly holds that 
Patmore’s “Essay on Metrical Law” “led to an abstraction of meter 
. . . theorized as a principle of spacing that could formalize temporal 
relations between abstract quantities, mentally perceived in the act of 
counting and not necessarily audible”; Joshua King goes yet further, 
arguing that such a prosody was fated to be “never realized in a human 
voice”; a section-heading from Jason Rudy’s recent Electric Meters, 
meanwhile, tells its own story, reading simply “Bodiless Patmore.”2
Yet none of these accounts—to which several more could readily 
be appended—consider the fact that Patmore not only did treat of the 
body, but did so with an obsessiveness and excessiveness that shocked 
many of his contemporaries.3 The now-dominant view of Patmore as 
poet of disembodiment establishes itself through five willed oversights: 
1) the separation of The Angel in the House from his other, highly 
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various, poetic output; 2) the exclusion of aphoristic and epigrammatic 
writings, such as The Rod, the Root, and the Flower; 3) the deracination 
of Patmore’s writing from European currents of thought, which it both 
borrowed from (G. W. F. Hegel, for instance), and itself influenced (for 
example, Paul Claudel); 4) the overemphasis upon one element within 
the Essay on English Metrical Law (“abstraction”) to the detriment of 
others; 5) the sustained aversion to consider the experimental quali-
ties of Patmore’s verse, in particular the great ode sequence gathered 
as The Unknown Eros (1877). The upshot of these exclusions is that 
Patmore appears to us today as the most English of authors, reactionary, 
provincial and fastidious—when in reality he vied with Swinburne as 
the most cosmopolitan of Victorian poets, being a radically conserva-
tive Hegelian and a heterodox Catholic and producing some of the 
most technically experimental verse in the English vernacular. Even 
John Maynard, who for several years has been waging a lonely and 
impassioned defense of Patmore’s “eroticism” (an effort that has clearly 
fallen on deaf ears), glosses over all bar 1).4
It is in order to counter such an idée reçue that the pun in the title 
of this article needs to be as blatant as it is. By it, I propose to restore 
the dynamic vitality that has always existed within Patmore’s corpus, in 
both senses of the term. This essay seeks to do so by reading in succes-
sion his aphoristic writings, his bilateral relation with contemporary 
mainland European culture, and—finally and most significantly—his 
verse technique within The Unknown Eros. But the aim of this critical 
reconsideration is not belatedly to return Patmore to the stage of the 
Fleshly School, as if all this time he had been anxiously awaiting his cue 
from the wings. It is rather to suggest that the recognition of Patmore’s 
corporeality necessarily forces us to reconsider also what fleshliness 
might truly mean, both for the Victorian age and for our own, and to 
rethink the casual oppositions (between abstract and concrete, mate-
rial and immaterial) that continue to stipulate what counts as a body.
******
Patmore’s alleged immateriality is frequently established through 
the significant contrast with some putatively more embodied thinker. 
In several of the critical accounts above, Gerard Manley Hopkins is 
the self-evident antitype: where Patmore’s metrical isochronism (in 
which each line holds the same duration, regardless of whether or not 
it is filled or voiced with verbal matter) leads naturally to abstraction, 
Hopkins’s vocal articulation (through the phenomenon that he calls 
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instress) generates a theologico-poetics of incarnation. As King summa-
rizes, “unlike Patmore, Hopkins identifies poetry’s affective meaning 
with the spoken sound of lines, rather than with the abstract pattern 
a reader might perceive governing the spaces and silences between 
lines.”5 The female poet Alice Meynell permits Yopie Prins a similar 
dichotomy, yet with an additional gendered dimension: “Without alto-
gether rejecting his principle of ‘catalexis,’ Meynell resists an artificial 
imposition of isochrony that tries to prescribe pauses: she prefers a 
more natural variation according to a more natural measure of time,” 
a natural measure that includes, among other things, the “rhythmic 
pangs of maternity.”6
Prins’s account of Meynell—who in Patmore’s later years represented 
both a poetic apostle and an unattainable love-object—is characteristi-
cally astute. Yet the implicit judgment that arises (that where Meynell 
“projects the metricality of verse into the universe, as a universal 
rhythmic experience that cannot be precisely measured but is felt 
inside and outside the body,” Patmore mandates artificial, decorpore-
alized “law”) raises several questions.7 Not least of them concerns the 
curious fact that, in the lengthy correspondence between Hopkins and 
Patmore, the former proves far more disquieted by the latter’s concep-
tion of the body than he is by the respective merits of temporal or 
accentual prosodies. In his letter dated 24 September 1883, Hopkins 
takes umbrage at a passage from The Angel in the House (“Because, 
although in act and word / As lowly as a wife can be, / Her manners 
when they call me lord / Remind me ’tis by courtesy”), but not in the 
way that a contemporary reader might expect.8 Hopkins writes,
Naturally a lurking error appears in more places than one and a false 
principle gives rise to false consequences. An ideal becomes an idol and 
false worship sets in. So I call it at p. 251, where it is said that a wife 
calls her husband lord by courtesy, meaning, as I understand, only by 
courtesy and ‘not with her least consent of will’ to his being so. But he 
is her lord. If it is courtesy only and no consent than a wife’s lowliness 
is hypocrisy and Christian marriage a comedy, a piece of pretence.9
It is somewhat surprising and dispiriting to find Hopkins—whose 
own sensuous verse can hardly be reduced to simple doctrinal state-
ment—criticize The Angel in the House not because its view of marital 
relations is hierarchical but because it is not hierarchical enough. 
That this idolatry or “false worship” is overwhelmingly a matter of 
bodily desire is shown by the preceding context of the same letter, in 
which Hopkins expounds at length on what he takes to be Patmore’s 
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problematic conception of female “vanity.” Noting The Angel in the 
House’s statement that “Women should be vain” he embarks upon a 
tirade of mounting pitch (P, 174):
In particular how can anyone admire or (except in charity, as the greatest 
of sins, but in judgment and approval) tolerate vanity in women? Is it 
not the beginning of their saddest and most characteristic fall? What 
but vanity makes them first publish, then prostitute their charms? In 
Leonardo’s famous picture, ‘Modesty and Vanity’ is it not almost taken 
for granted that the one figure is that of a virgin, the other that of a 
courtezan? If modesty in women means two things at once, purity and 
humility, must not the pair of opposites be no great way apart, vanity 
from impurity? Who can think of the Blessed Virgin and of vanity?10
Such passages threaten to slip loose from the gentlemanly restraint 
that otherwise characterizes the pair’s correspondence. Patmore replies 
amicably yet firmly: “I did not mean ‘vanity’ however in the sense in 
which you read it. I meant Honoria’s pleasure in her lover’s delight in 
her beauty—a sense in which some great Doctor, a Saint—I think St. 
Augustine—says that there was a little vanity in the Blessed Virgin. 
(‘Sweet to myself that am so sweet to thee.’)”11
What are we to make of such a brief yet intense contention, which 
quickly dissipates in Patmore’s responses to Hopkins’s more humdrum 
textual emendations? Certainly, we would not want to say that because 
Hopkins entertains a drastically austere view of the (female) devo-
tional body, this precludes him from writing verse that is embodied 
in an unprecedented manner. Historical examples abound in which a 
doctrinal reserve communicates itself through paradoxically sensuous 
means; and in any case, Hopkins clearly intends a distinction between 
those bodies that bear divine grace, and those that do not. We could, 
hypothetically, say the obverse of Patmore: that what appears to be 
an extremely heterodox conception of female beauty (it is difficult to 
imagine what dictum from St. Augustine he had in mind, although 
the following citation is readily traceable, being the concluding lines 
to Patmore’s own “The Azalea,” from book 1 of the Unknown Eros) 
would not prevent him from writing verse of an austere, plain, or 
mechanical kind.
But Patmore’s “vanity” cuts far deeper than such a hypothesis 
suggests. Within his later writings, the question of erotic comport-
ment moves beyond normative statement (“Women should be vain”) 
to become perhaps his single dominating concern; a concern, more-
over, that is present not merely as theme, but also, and appropriately, 
843Ewan Jones
as formal embodiment. The comparative self-restraint that Patmore 
exercised in his rejoinder to Hopkins would become a fully-fledged 
eroticism in a passage from “Homo,” one of the several collections of 
aphorisms and epigrams collected as The Rod the Root, and the Flower:
The Angels gain credibility and human sympathy from the doctrine of 
their defect of absolute purity; and nothing has made the idea of the 
Blessed Virgin so amiable in my sight as the saying of St. Augustine that 
the only sin she is chargeable with is a little vanity in the consciousness 
of being the Bride and Mother of God. O felix culpa, without which 
she would not have been a woman! If we must think of the Infinite, 
the most profitable way is to think of God as having made Himself 
infinitely small, a mere babe sucking a woman’s breast, to suit Himself 
to the smallness of our capacities.12
Given Hopkins’s reaction to the submerged eroticism of The Angel 
in the House, it is not difficult to imagine the force of his reaction to 
such untrammelled passages. Indeed, we do not even have to imagine 
it: for it is well known that when Patmore presented him with his 
unfinished prose manuscript “Sponsa Dei”—whose contents, we can 
be sure, developed the parallel of erotic and divine love—Hopkins’s 
reaction was vehement enough to encourage Patmore to commit the 
work (which he considered the summation of his mature thought) to 
the flames.
Early twentieth-century editors of the two poets have, with varying 
degrees of partisanship, disputed the directness between Hopkins’s crit-
icism and Patmore’s immolation.13 But I am not principally concerned 
with such a debate here. It is difficult to believe that whatever Sponsa 
Dei contained, it was anything more inflammatory (for somebody of 
Hopkins’s persuasion) than much of what is contained within The 
Rod, The Root, and The Flower. There, the strikingly heterodox image 
of God made over into a suckling infant hardly counts as an excit-
able lapse. For the body is the single dominant theme in Patmore’s 
aphoristic writing, worked over with an energy that is monomaniacal 
yet also dynamic, as it shuttles between erotic and divine poles. The 
following complete aphorism (from “Aurea Dicta”) demonstrates just 
how much charged space spans those two extremes:
“Under the Tree where thy mother was debauched, I have redeemed 
thee.” “We are healed by the serpent by which we were slain.” It is by 
the natural desires that we were slain, and it is by the natural desires, 
made truly natural by inoculation with the Body of Christ, that we 
are ultimately saved. Religion has no real power until it becomes 
natural. (R, 42)
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Patmore here makes characteristically deft use of the unattributed 
quotation (whose biblical provenance we assume) so as to manage 
the highly sensitive material. Yet lingering doubts remain: precisely 
which sacred text is here being translated into the profane language 
of debauchery? The two interposed quotations that commence the 
aphorism derive their force less from being renderings of a spiritual 
authority, than from the chiasmic motion that they set up, both indi-
vidually and cumulatively: from “debauched” to “redeemed,” from 
“healed” back again to “slain.”
Of the innumerable passages that develop this corporeal worship, 
a couple more should suffice to make the point. Firstly: “‘The human 
form divine.’ It is actually divine; for the Body is the house of God, 
and an image of Him, though the Devil may be its present tenant”—a 
whole entry that hardly stands in need of extrinsic comment (R, 41). 
The clipped aphorism, “Those who know God know that it is quite a 
mistake to suppose that there are only five senses,” further suggests 
that what exceeds bodily finitude is not abstraction, but sensuousness 
of a different order (R, 53). “Abstract” is, indeed (contrary to the 
reception of the Essay on English Metrical Law), always a pejorative 
term for Patmore: worship is “not an article of abstract faith, but a 
fact discerned in our own bodies or souls” (R, 71). The real ques-
tion accordingly becomes not whether the body counts for Patmore 
(for it manifestly does), but under what conditions and modalities it 
presents itself.
Most obviously: Patmore’s body is a feminized body. It is through 
the emblematic images of Eve’s “debauch,” St Agnes’s pious fervor, the 
“vanity” of the female lover that corporeal existence most fully discloses 
its divine role: “The woman is the man’s ‘glory’,” states Patmore, in a 
similar vein to above, “and she naturally delights in the praises which 
are assurances that she is fulfilling her function; and she gives herself 
to him who succeeds in convincing her that she, of all others, is best 
able to discharge it for him. A woman without this kind of ‘vanity’ is a 
monster” (R, 51). This hardly clears Patmore of the charge of misogyny, 
although it does change the nature of the charges. Hopkins may well 
have entertained a more unforgiving view of marital relations based 
on literal submission; yet however much room Patmore by contrast 
allocates to female “delight,” such delight nonetheless remains bound 
to “fulfilling her function.”
But Patmore’s feminized body is also a more elusive (and perhaps 
still more disturbing) presence. For all that it stands as a subject 
and object of male desire, so too does it collapse the very distinction 
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between female and male. After all, one of the principal reasons for 
Hopkins’s intense discomfort was his sense that Patmore had pushed 
too far the established analogy of the relation between husband and 
wife and between Jesus and the Church. As several aphorisms make 
plain, the ties that bind both parties together are erotic and matrimonial 
in each case; so the feminized body is at once also the body of any 
worshipper who awaits God’s presence:
“The soul of the Lover lives in the body of his Mistress”, says Plutarch. 
“Ye are two in one flesh”, says St. Paul. “My body is already joined to 
God”, says St. Agnes. “She who loves God is chaste, she who touches 
him is clean, she who embraces him is a virgin indeed”, says another 
great Saint. (R, 53)
Once again we note the manner in which non- or half-attribution 
emerges as a strategy (“says another great Saint”) precisely where 
doctrine risks itself: here, at the point where Patmore suggests that 
to love God is to touch Him. The pronoun “She” that endures now 
appears in a far more figurative guise than the specific “Mistress” that 
opened the aphorism. Elsewhere, indeed, Patmore is at pains to show 
that this devotional touch is a matter for the worshipper in general:
The “touch” of God is not a figure of speech. “Touch”, says Aquinas, 
“applies to spiritual as well as to material things.” The same authority 
says, “Touch is the sense of alimentation, taste that of saviour.” A perfect 
life ends, as it begins, in the simplicity of infancy: it knows nothing of 
God on whom it feeds other than by touch and taste. The fullness of 
intelligence is the obliteration of intelligence. (R, 81)
I said above that in certain respects, Patmore’s conception of the 
female body can be considered more disturbing than the conventional 
misogyny with which he is associated. The reason for this is that the 
conception of an asymmetric erotic relation (between the lover and 
his mistress, between God and His worshipper), in addition to risking 
religious heterodoxy, intuits a complex dialectic of desire. Sex and 
faith equally proceed through a constant alternation between fulfill-
ment and anticipation, recollection, postponement, denial, and even 
disgust; desire itself is not a simple property that arises from a subject 
but rather the product of an intersubjective field of recognition or 
misrecognition, the shuttling of gazes, the phantasmal identification 
with an Other who in turn desires. Embodied worship, moreover, 
itself feminizes the devout male: “The divine manhood, indeed, may 
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be discerned in man through the cloud of that womanhood of which 
he is a participator” (R, 111). (Even the apparently restrained Angel in 
the House had made the arresting claim that “Female and male God 
made the man; / His image is the whole, not half” [P, 107]).
The significance of Patmore’s intuition I take to be twofold. On 
the one hand, his pushing of erotic “worship” into the realm of the 
Absolute curiously results in an often unsurpassed account of the 
intricacy and perversity of actual (“profane”) human sexuality. On 
the other, this account emerges through, and produces, an equally 
unprecedented version of a particular kind of formal embodiment—
here the aphorism. Put simply, Patmore’s aphoristic writing, despite its 
neglect, deserves to be considered as some of the finest specimens of 
the mode in English, alongside anything to be found in Oscar Wilde, 
or William Blake’s The Marriage of Heaven and Hell, or Samuel Taylor 
Coleridge’s Aids to Reflection. (The surprising lack of critical interest 
in the aphorism in English, while it might help to explain this lack of 
consideration of Patmore in particular, is an issue beyond the purview 
of this present essay.)
Where Wilde’s epigrammatic pithiness derives much of its force from 
the sudden inversion of moral codes that nonetheless need to be kept 
in play for the détournement to have its effect (“A man can’t be too 
careful in the choice of his enemies,” “Divorces are made in Heaven”), 
Patmore’s aphorisms prove true instances of dialectical thinking, in 
that they show the dynamic process by which antinomies emerge, 
implicate one another, and are sublated into a third term irreducible 
to its constituents.14 The very concision of the aphoristic form is used 
in this respect negatively to indicate and touch a more boundless world 
of meaning or feeling, in a manner that recalls Patmore’s definition of 
the deity (making use once again of vague attribution): “‘God’, says 
a great Philosopher—Proclus, If I remember rightly—‘is not infinite, 
but the synthesis of Infinite and Boundary’” (R, 21). I will consider 
below the means by which Patmore’s verse conducts a comparable 
synthesis, but for now it is interesting to note his distinction that 
“[t]he most ardent love is rather epigrammatic than lyrical. The Saints, 
above all St. Augustine, abound in epigrams” (R, 54).
It is a fitting indication of Patmore’s idiosyncrasy that this so often 
reserved or austere author would indeed often be most ardent through 
the typically clipped or urbane form of the epigram. At times such 
feeling emerges in the form of strikingly direct statement (“The ardour 
chills us which we do not share” [R, 37]), or in a preternatural awareness 
of the way in which—call it perversity, call it dialectics—temptation 
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and self-denial frequently amount to the same thing (“The sweetness 
even of self-denial wears with time, and becomes tediously easy” 
[R, 33]). But Patmore’s finest aphorisms do not merely describe such 
a process; they also enact it. The remarkable epigram, “The more 
wild and incredible your desire the more willing and prompt God is 
in fulfilling it, if you will have it so” (R, 37), extends the prospect of a 
fulfillment that would be both infinite and entirely harmonious with 
God’s own, before checking back abruptly; “if you will have it so” might 
feel at first like a simple extension of unlimited desire, only to reveal 
itself suddenly also as the conditionality of self-realized responsibility. 
Elsewhere, Patmore daringly gives a further turn of the screw to 
Plato’s parable of the Cave, to suggest that we go back to the shadows, 
having grasped their epiphenomenal nature: for those images, “being 
attributed by us to their true origin, are immeasurably more satisfying 
than they were before, and may be delighted in without blame”; the 
shadow “has now obtained a core of substance” (R, 76).
******
Countless other examples could be appended; yet the more the 
quality of Patmore’s writing is attested, the more pressing becomes 
the question of its marginalization. Patmore’s quixotic attempt to 
obtain a core of substance even for the shadow might well have found 
an appreciative audience in the Cambridge Platonists of the seven-
teenth century; by the mid-Victorian moment, however (where even 
sympathizers such as Aubrey de Vere counseled Patmore against a 
too candid exposition of his views), such tarrying with the immate-
rial was always bound to seem suspect.15 The reasons for such a shift 
are too large and contentious fully to explore here, though it would 
clearly be reductive to explain them away simply through an appeal to 
Victorian positivism and/or prurience. We might speculate that when 
Joseph Priestley and other eighteenth-century materialists reacted 
against Henry More’s notion of the extended yet immaterial soul, they 
established a working notion of the physical world defined, above all, 
by its manifest properties. Hopkins, while in many respects hardly an 
orthodox philosopher in the English tradition, nevertheless similarly 
cleaved to an understanding of matter as haecceitas: as what Duns 
Scotus considered the tangible particularity, or thisness, of a thing.
Patmore’s corporeality is by contrast dynamic, in the sense that 
divine essence does not merely infuse bounded entities, but rather 
emerges through the relation of plural bodies. A treatment of desire 
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that takes into account its mediation through the other (whether divine 
or profane) and its temporal articulation in the form of anticipation 
and recollection is bound to seem diffuse or “abstract” judged by the 
standards of a crude materialism; yet it remains a genuine account of 
embodied experience for all that. It is for this reason that Patmore’s 
views are frequently better explained (in both the causal and herme-
neutic sense) when placed in the context of continental European 
philosophical and theological thought of the nineteenth century. In this 
respect, I consider his example both as a consolidation and extension of 
Anne Jamison’s recent claim in Poetics en Passant that the relationship 
between Victorian and European verse culture is a more dynamic and 
bilateral one than is commonly supposed.16
The Catholic vocabulary of incarnation and transubstantiation more 
readily available in Continental Europe naturally helps facilitate this 
greater openness to Patmore’s heterodox body. When the French poet 
Claudel wrote his “Lettre sur Coventry Patmore” in the second volume 
of his Positions et Propositions he was able not only to countenance 
but to celebrate the analogy between human and divine love that so 
troubled even Patmore’s fellow English converts to Catholicism. “Two 
ideas,” states Claudel, “have dominated the life and work of Coventry 
Patmore: the first being that of conjugal Love, the other that of a finite 
world” [Coventry Patmore a eu deux idées qui dominent son œvre et 
sa vie: l’une est celle de l’Amour conjugal, l’autre est celle d’un monde 
fini].17 (Claudel first heard of Patmore’s work during his retreat at the 
monastery of Solesmes in 1900, where he became acquainted with 
the Bishop of Rochester’s son, who had selections of the Unknown 
Eros to hand; his letter is addressed to Father Ubald, the editor of 
Études franciscaines.)
Given such compositional circumstances, we might therefore be 
tempted to conclude that Patmore appealed principally by virtue of 
being that fairly exotic breed, the Anglo-Catholic poet. Yet Claudel 
treats Patmore’s “finitude” with a sensitivity that transcends doctrinal 
affiliation. “The whole nineteenth century,” he asserts, “was persuaded 
that creation was infinite, that beyond this world lay others, innumer-
able others, all populated with intelligent souls and creatures perhaps 
superior to us. There is no conception more foolishly vertiginous, more 
deleterious for the imagination, and more thoroughly demeaning for 
our dignity” [Tout le dix-neuvième siècle a vécu dans le persuasion que 
la création était infini, qu’au delà de ce monde, il y en avait encore 
d’autres, et d’autres indéfiniment, tous peuplés d’âmes intelligentes et 
de créatures peut-être supérieures à nous. Il n’y a pas de conception 
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plus niaisement vertigineuse, plus délétère pur l’imagination et plus 
parfaitement avilissante pour notre dignité].18 The circle is at once 
symbol of infinity and finitude, Claudel continues, in a formulation 
that recalls Patmore’s definition of God as “synthesis of boundary 
and Infinite” (though he was unacquainted with the latter’s aphoristic 
writing). The question accordingly becomes: if God is not intuited as 
infinite, how is the worshipper to experience His palpability?
Claudel allots Patmore two responses. The first, as suggested above, 
is marital union: not in the form of The Angel in the House (of which 
he was again ignorant), but rather through the erotic candor of the 
Psyche Odes, which Claudel calls “smiling paraphrases of the Song 
of Solomon” [une paraphrase souriante de l’hymne de Salomon].19 
The second is the very form of poetry, as distinct from its subject 
matter: the “Lettre sur Coventry Patmore” concludes with Claudel’s 
passable if inexact translation of the opening of another of the Odes, 
“Legum Tuam Dilexi,” which begins, appositely, with the lines “The 
‘Infinite.’ Word horrible! at feud / with life” (P, 405).  While Claudel’s 
lexical selections are occasionally sloppy or over-literal (he had no 
firm command of the English language), he dutifully preserves the 
highly irregular line-lengths of Patmore’s ode form, which we will later 
examine in more depth. Accordingly, when he renders the final line 
as a full alexandrine (“Pour remplir l’affreuse immensité de l’espace”; 
Patmore gives the decasyllabic “And fill the ghastly boundlessness of 
space”) following several severely truncated lines (“L’inconnu,” “Dit 
oui”), he gives a nicely French twist to the manner in which verse 
form itself can render empty space tangible.20
Claudel’s translation of Patmore (he published several further 
adaptations as “Poèmes de Coventry Patmore,” which appeared in the 
September and October 1911 issues of the Nouvelle Revue Française) 
therefore poses a number of tantalizing questions. It is tempting to 
conclude that, if Patmore’s experiments with the irregular ode did not 
directly influence Claudel’s own Cinq Grandes Odes (1907), they at the 
least represented a substantive counterpart to the latter’s own verse, 
which pushed the traditional resources of French meter to their limit. 
We might also speculate that a fundamental affinity exists between 
Patmore’s conception of the isochronous line (which endures even 
without verbal matter) and Claudel’s conception of the line-as-breath, 
which he developed in “Reflexions sur le vers français,” once more in 
the Nouvelle Revue Française, in November 1925.
It is therefore possible to reprise the argument that I stated above 
in a philosophical register, so as to apply it to prosody: just as there 
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are other means of considering the body distinct from a crudely 
leveling materialism, so too does the embodied voice inhere not only 
in the articulated syllable or heavy stress, but also through the vocal 
suspension or breath that endures palpably in the allegedly “abstract” 
space of Patmore’s line. For this reason, Prins’s suggestion of a choice 
between “turning to the example of French poetry in order to break 
the regular beat of verse” and “the English metrical law exemplified in 
Patmore’s odes” amounts to a bad choice.21 While he may perhaps be a 
less fashionable example than Arthur Rimbaud or Stéphane Mallarmé, 
Claudel disrupted “the regular beat” in no less significant or distinctive 
a manner; and in such a way that had much in common with Patmore 
himself. Why Claudel’s poetic innovation is downplayed in comparison 
to other proponents of freer verse, despite his significant anticipation 
of Charles Olson’s own “breath-poetics,” is a moot point; doctrinal 
views must have much to do with it.22 Rather than reproduce the lazy 
conservative-devout/radical-atheist divide, however, I would prefer to 
see both Claudel and Patmore as radical conservatives: as conservatives 
moved to formal radicalism precisely through the increasing coolness 
with which society received their belief.
Be this as it may, Patmore’s conception of the body pertains far 
beyond a strictly theological context. For in addition to being a figure 
of interest for French Catholics such as Claudel and Gide, he also 
proved one of the earliest and most sensitive English readers of 
Hegel; no small achievement, given the interest in that philosopher’s 
“mysteries” that was beginning to percolate through English society 
by the 1850s.23 (The mainstream aversion to “German metaphysics” 
contributed to the subsequent forgetting of this episode, which W. J. 
Mander’s excellent British Idealism: A History has however recently 
recovered.)24 One of the more extended aphorisms from The Rod, 
The Root, and the Flower shows the extent to which the dialectically 
mediated, erotic relationship between lover/worshipper and mistress/
God owes a debt to Hegel:
Who, except perhaps, Hegel, has ever noted, except by way of poetical 
metaphor, the surprising fact, simply natural and of general experience, 
of the double and reciprocal consciousness of love; that marvellous state 
in which each of two persons in distinct bodies perceives sensibly all 
that the other feels in regard to him or herself, although their feelings 
are of the most opposite characters; and this so completely, each 
discerning and enjoying the distinct desire and felicity of the other, that 
you might say that in each was the fullness of both sexes. To note one 
such human fact as this is to exalt life to fuller consciousness, and to do 
more for true science than to discover a thousand new suns. (R, 108)
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Patmore’s specific and sustained elaboration of Hegel helps us to 
re-evaluate not only the former’s achievement, but also the means by 
which the latter influenced Victorian thought in general, and its “new 
prosody” more particularly. The fullest overview of this somewhat 
counterintuitive history remains Dennis Taylor’s Hardy’s Metres and 
Victorian Prosody, which uncovers the direct link between Hegel’s 
aesthetics and the isochronic theories of Patmore and T. S. Omond, 
where verse operates according to the “musical bar analogy.”25 Taylor 
explains such influence through an “abstraction” that he takes to be 
common to both approaches: Hegel’s account of music, he summarizes, 
establishes a “dialectic between the abstract bar-like rhythm and the 
melody”; such a pattern emerges similarly in classical poetry, where 
the opposition is between “the ‘feet’ and the phrases.”26 While modern 
prosody is characterized by its lack of “any precise abstract structure,” 
Taylor nonetheless understands Hegel to inspire a similarly opposi-
tional conception of meter, namely, the opposition between “abstract 
metrical form and . . . individual speech rhythms.”27 From here it is 
a short step to Pinch’s claim “that meter is important as an abstract 
idea in your mind against which you measure how the line would 
actually be spoken if it were spoken”; and thereafter, to the decision 
to dispense with vocal performance altogether.28 The logical terminus 
is the received notion of Patmore’s meter as pure disembodiment with 
which this essay commenced.
Taylor is quite right to insist on Hegel’s pre-eminence for a genera-
tion of English prosody; yet his summary heading of “abstraction” 
fatally impoverishes the complexity of that theory and its afterlives. As 
a preliminary, we should note that abstrakt always is a complex (and 
frequently pejorative) term for Hegel (for proof see his 1807 essay, 
“Who Thinks Abstractly?”).29 Not only is “abstract” the first stage in 
the Phenomenology’s abstract-negative-concrete dialectical triad; so 
too does the very analysis of “rhythm” on which Taylor draws offer 
a conception very remote from musical disembodiment. Hegel does, 
it is true, on occasion refer to “the rhythm of the bar” to indicate an 
unvarying and ideal entity. Yet this abstract property does not simply 
mark itself off from an animating, performative force, against which 
it is inoculated, and with which it holds nothing in common. Rather, 
that animating force is itself “rhythm,” just as much as the abstract 
beat that it displaces: “the counter-thrust between the rhythm of the 
bar and that of the melody comes out at its sharpest in what are called 
syncopations.”30
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Rhythm, in other words, is at once abstract law and the animating 
force that disrupts that law: a form that asserts itself, paradoxically, 
by departing from its own example. (A reductive account of Hegel’s 
prosody may well represent both a symptom of, and a contributing 
factor to, readings of the Hegelian system as “closed,” or “totalizing”; 
the notion of rhythm as self-departing phenomenon, for which I am 
attempting to argue, has something in common with what Catherine 
Malabou calls “plasticity”; indeed, Hegel expressly links that concept 
to rhythm.)31
Throughout its treatment of music, the Lectures on Fine Art presses 
home this notion of rhythm as internal variation: “If . . . the melody 
keeps strictly in its rhythm and parts to the rhythm of the beat,” writes 
Hegel immediately following the above citation, “then it really sounds 
humdrum, bare and lacking in invention. What may be demanded in 
this connection is, in brief, freedom from the pedantry of metre and 
the barbarism of a uniform rhythm” (L, 918). Hegel even goes so 
far as to make the interplay between time and rhythm central to the 
dialectical emergence of the subject. In order to recognize the self as 
self, the subject must break up “undifferentiated duration” into a series 
of intervals: “its self-concentration interrupts the indefinite series of 
points of time and makes gaps in their abstract continuity” (L, 914).
Measure, then, is the means by which the self unfolds, negatively; far 
from essentially “abstract,” it transfigures the temporal material upon 
which it operates. Hence Hegel goes on to insist that “the satisfaction 
which the self acquires, owing to the bar, in the rediscovery of itself 
is all the more complete because the unity and uniformity does not 
pertain either to time or to the notes in themselves; it is by the self for 
its own self-satisfaction. For in nature this abstract identity does not 
exist” (L, 915).32 Unlike the fixed proportions of architecture (whose 
identical quantities do exist in space), the negative work of measure 
proceeds truly “from the spirit.” As such, meter can hardly be seen 
to share the unchanging and immaterial essence that we customarily 
ascribe to pure mathematics: it is rather a specific act, constituted by 
(and constitutive of) the subject, at a particular historical situation. 
And this determinative act itself invariably produces variation, which 
proceeds not from some allegedly external sphere (“performance”), 
but is rather fully intrinsic: “however strictly the specific beat has to 
govern the variety of duration . . . nevertheless its domination is not 
to extend so far that it dominates the variety quite abstractly” (L, 916). 
Far from rhythm being identical with the bar, as Taylor claims, this 
unfolding dialectic of law and variation “is brought about by means 
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of rhythm which alone brings proper animation to the time and the 
bar” (L, 917).
All of the above examples derive from Hegel’s consideration of 
music. Yet just as “music begins in recitative to liberate itself from the 
motionless sameness of the beat,” so poetic meter operates according 
to a still more dynamic principle (L, 1018). Hegel gives short shrift 
to modern attempts to emulate the putatively unvarying norms of 
quantitative, classical verse: “When Voss wants to read even alcaic and 
Sapphic stanzas in these abstractedly uniform time-intervals, this is only 
a capricious fancy and means doing violence to the verse” (L, 1018). 
While Hegel is acutely aware of the differences pertaining to classical 
and vernacular prosody (of which more in a moment), both systems of 
organization have this self-variation in common: “the classical iambic 
trimeter acquires its beauty especially from its not consisting of six 
similarly timed iambic feet . . . and in this way the continual repeti-
tion of the same time-measure and anything like the beat is avoided” 
(L, 918); similarly, “[i]n modern times Reichardt and others seem to 
me to have brought a new rhythmic life into song-composition precisely 
by abandoning . . . iambic sing-song” (L, 919).
Given all the above, it is hard to see how Hegel’s prosody could 
be entertained for any length of time as uncomplicatedly “abstract.” 
Isobel Armstrong’s “Metre and Meaning” offers a welcome corrective, 
saluting Patmore for “recognizing that Hegel’s idealism did not abne-
gate the ‘body’ of corporeal language, as has often been thought.”33 
(Armstrong is here courteous enough not to name names.) The salutary 
effect of this essay extends beyond its specific treatment of Patmore 
and Hegel (although Armstrong wavers somewhat over how well the 
former really did read the latter) to a more general consideration of 
the position of nineteenth-century poetry within a broader historical 
dialectic of versification.34 That position is not unproblematic: while 
the transition from what Hegel calls “classical” to “romantic” art is a 
process of increasing interiorization, such development (as Armstrong 
rightly stresses) nonetheless embodies itself in new forms. On the 
other hand, however, Hegel’s account of the transition from classical 
to modern prosody is suffused with a sense of irremediable loss: once, 
writes Armstrong, “the poet availed himself of the complex of sound 
signs whose relation both to one another and to lexical elements, is 
meaning making.” Yet “Patmore, like Hegel, recognized that age was 
gone.”35
Hegel resolves this apparent contradiction through the modern 
emergence of rhyme, whose historical situation and cognitive purchase 
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Simon Jarvis has explored with acuity.36 Armstrong’s own analysis, 
by contrast, chooses to underplay the sonorous element, where the 
expressive variations of which modern verse remains capable instead 
signal the intercession of print culture: “I believe that the interest in 
variation and its equivalents (for example, counterpoint and syncopa-
tion) could arise only when readers began to see the text rather than 
hear it.”37 Yet I feel that this purchase of modern rhythmical variation 
at the cost of sonority pays too dear a price.38 In what follows, I want 
to suggest that Patmore proved an astute reader of Hegel precisely 
by refusing either to renounce the acoustic force of “classical” meter, 
or to preserve it only by converting it to “romantic” rhyme. Rather, 
he demonstrates precisely that sonorous variations remain available 
to modern practitioners, in however transfigured a form; in so doing, 
he demonstrates that the Hegelian account of prosodic development 
is far more complex than might at first appear.
To be sure, Hegel does sometimes describe truly rhythmical verse 
as Armstrong suggests: “an age [that] was gone.” Having demonstrated 
so compellingly that classical meters permit self-variation precisely 
through their lawfulness, it is rather dispiriting to find Hegel conclude 
the section on “Rhythmical Variation” with the summary verdict that in
[Modern] languages there is little room for rhythm, or the soul has 
little freedom any longer to spread itself in it, because time, and the 
sound of syllables outpoured uniformly with the movement of time, is 
surpassed by something more ideal, i.e. by the sense and meaning of 
words, and in this way the power of a more independent rhythmical 
configuration is damped down. (L, 1022)
Yet to move from this to Armstrong’s claim that “for classical prosody 
the caesura’s break is integral to the pattern of the verse and organic 
to its flow,” whereas in our present age “Walter Benjamin’s empty, 
meaningless time and the ‘modern’ caesura are alike,” involves no 
little distortion. For one thing, so far from the caesura being mere 
“empty time,” Benjamin himself specifically developed the former 
term—which he found Friedrich Hölderlin to enunciate most force-
fully—as a means of comprehending the productively interruptive 
forces proper to modernity: “dialectics at a standstill” is one of his 
better-known terms for such a phenomenon.39
On a deeper level, however, Armstrong’s tale about the modern 
demise of the caesura simplifies Hegel’s own account: while her sense of 
the general movements of Hegel’s Lectures is generally sure, she does 
not often engage directly with the text itself. And that text here treats 
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caesura in a productively ambiguous manner, which not infrequently 
contradicts Hegel’s headline view that “rhythm” is no longer possible 
for us moderns. As even the above quote shows, such a rhythmical 
demise would in any case have to do not with the caesura, so much as a 
more general linguistic shift: as Hegel explores in detail, it is the move 
from an inflected language such as Latin, to an accentual prosody such 
as German, which effects the modern tendency to stress sense rather 
than sound (see L, 1020–22). But this hardly annuls the possibility 
for pause, or caesurae. Syllabic languages such as French and Italian 
may, according to Hegel, “lack metre and rhythm in the classical sense 
altogether,” yet the caesura figures as prominently in the alexendrin as 
in any other metrical form (L, 1027). Indeed, Hegel himself sometimes 
explicitly suggests that the caesura (so far from having vanished or 
been eclipsed by rhyme) endures for modernity, in however altered 
a guise. Classical versification, we recall, staged a conflict between 
law and invariable variation; yet something similar appears to govern 
German rhymed iambics, which “we are accustomed to scan more in 
accordance with a beat than is the case with the rhymeless iambics of 
classical antiquity. Nevertheless, halting at caesuras, the emphasis on 
single words to be markedly pronounced according to their sense, and 
stopping on them, may produce once more a counter-thrust to abstract 
sameness and therefore an enlivening variety” (L, 1033). Moreover, 
when Hegel leaves off his account of versification to consider poetic 
genre, the lyric (that most emblematically “romantic” of genres) is seen 
precisely to permit “(i) a rather variegated ranging of longs and shorts 
in a broken inequality of rhythmic feet, (ii) the varied kinds of caesura, 
and (iii) the rounding-off of into strophes which in themselves and 
their succession may have a wealth of variation both in the length and 
shortness of single lines and in their rhythmical variation” (L, 1136). 
The cognitive potential that Jarvis accords to rhyme, in short, would 
appear no less available for even the modern caesura.
I have treated Hegel’s conception of prosody and rhythm in such 
detail so as to show that Patmore’s Essay on English Metrical Law, 
which has long served as the indictment of his “mentalization” of meter, 
in reality proves nothing of the sort. Rather, it develops both Hegel’s 
general conception of measure as self-variation, and, more specifically, 
of the pause or caesura as a specific instance of how such self-variation 
might unfold within a modern horizon. Patmore once again wears his 
influences on his sleeve:
856 Coventry Patmore’s Corpus
The nature of the relation between the poet’s peculiar mode of 
expression and the matter expressed has engaged the curiosity of many 
philosophic minds. Hegel, whose chapters on music and metre contain 
by far the most satisfactory piece of writing I know of on the subject, 
admirably observes, that versification affords a necessary counterpoise 
to the great spiritualisation of language in poetry. ‘It is false’, he adds, 
‘that versification offers any obstacle to the free outpouring of poetic 
thought. True genius disposes with ease of sensible materials, and 
moves therein as in a native element, which, instead of depressing 
or hindering, exalts and supports its flight.’ Art, indeed, must have a 
body as well as a soul; and the higher and purer the spiritual, the more 
powerful and unmistakable should be the corporeal element;—in other 
words, the more vigorous and various the life, the more stringent and 
elaborate must be the law by obedience to which life expresses it.40
Jason Rudy cites precisely this emphatic declaration as proof that 
Patmore’s Essay “relegates to the sidelines ‘the corporeal element,’” 
thereby showcasing his “utter disdain for rhythm”: “Patmore’s overall 
project throughout the 1850s,” he concludes, “is to abstract poetry 
from corporeal experience.”41 But even if there is indeed something 
rather stentorian in Patmore’s above specification of a “stringent” and 
“elaborate” (yet specifically corporeal!) law, the Essay as a whole could 
not be less “disdainful” of rhythm. Far from the body being simply 
subsumed to an unvarying higher order, law and life interrelate just 
as dynamically as for Hegel. “In the finest specimens of versification,” 
Patmore continues, “there seems to be a perpetual conflict between 
the law of the verse and the freedom of the language, and each is 
incessantly, though insignificantly, violated for the purpose of giving 
effect to the other” (E, 9). A “cultivated ear . . . rather delights in, than 
objects to [rhythmical variation] when there is an emotional motive, 
as indicating an additional degree of that artistic consciousness, to 
the expression of which, Hegel traces the very life of meter” (E, 22).
Even when Patmore makes his central claim, that the ictus, 
“for the most part…has no material and external existence at all” 
(E, 11)—a claim that is often extracted from its context to serve alone 
as a convenient summary of the Essay—things are not as simple as they 
appear. As Joseph Phelan notes, Patmore is specifically arguing against 
a physiological account of prosody that would be so reductively material 
as to identify accent with a particular region of the tongue or palate.42 
You don’t have to be a card-carrying Hegelian (though it certainly 
helps) to believe that this kind of “material” cannot ever amount to the 
actuality of experience. And indeed, for all that Patmore’s prosody does 
involve a necessary operation of mind, this mental process is shown to 
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be irreducibly affective and corporeal throughout. “[T]he musical and 
metrical expression of emotion is an instinct, and not an artifice,” he 
states: “Were the vulgar and infantine delight in rhythm insufficient 
to justify that conviction, history itself would prove it” (E, 9).
Vulgar and infantine are not meant here as pejorative terms. For 
childish instinct already engages in a complex, embodied play with 
law and periodicity, where as in Hegel the imposition of an apparently 
“abstract” pattern testifies to a subject’s concrete, formative activity. “If 
Grétry,” writes Patmore, referring to the eighteenth-century French 
composer, “when a child, danced to the pulsations of a waterfall, it was 
because his fancy abolished their monotony. The ticking of a clock is 
truly monotonous; but when we listen to it, we hear, or rather seem to 
hear, two, or even four, distinct tones, upon the imaginary distinction 
of which, and the equally imaginary emphasis of one or two, depends 
what we call its rhythm” (E, 16). The individual appropriation of meter 
here could not be less like Rudy’s equation of “in one’s own head” and 
“internal metronome”: so far from abstraction amounting to objective, 
supra-personal quantity, it secures for the subject phenomenological 
variety!43 Even when Patmore does seem to approach what Eric 
Griffiths called the printed voice of Victorian poetry, arguing that the 
“ideal” reader of Shakespeare will render the text in a more complex 
manner than most contemporary real persons are able (E, 19), his 
argument is grounded less upon an absolute distinction than upon the 
historical shift to “an age of unnatural divorce of sound and sense” 
(E, 18). “Verse itself,” despite Armstrong’s claim for the displacement 
of aurality by visibility, is still “only verse on the condition of right 
reading” (E, 11). Even rhyme, the distinctively “romantic” phenom-
enon that was supposed to have superseded rhythmical prosody, in 
fact only deepens the expressive possibilities for the caesura, which 
as we have seen even Hegel could not fully deny: “[R]hyme . . . is 
the great means, in modern languages, of marking essential metrical 
pauses” (E, 31). When even the Essay on English Metrical Law reveals 
that abstraction and law are involved in a complex dialectic with vocal 
performance and corporeal experience, we have to begin to wonder 
what proof of Patmore’s disembodiment is left standing. How far his 
great ode sequence The Unknown Eros extends and complicates this 
pattern of body-thinking, we shall now see.
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Hitherto I have argued that the breadth of Patmore’s mature 
thinking—from his aphoristic writing, to his Hegelianized prosody—
reveals a consistent preoccupation with embodiment, which nonethe-
less refuses to reduce itself to a leveling materialism. The ode sequence 
gathered as the two-book Unknown Eros provides the most significant 
treatment of this complex embodiment. Yet for it to do so, that verse 
represents not only a continuation of Patmore’s prose theorization of 
corporeality; so too does it exceed and challenge even what I have 
attempted to argue are the more dynamic and fluid specifications of 
Patmore’s Essay. For all that Patmore’s prosodic theory would indeed 
sometimes like to preserve a “high and stately lyrical feeling” linked to 
the uniform pause, The Unknown Eros in fact achieves something far 
more interesting (E, 28). Its actualization or non-actualization of the 
long pause comprises at once the intuited need for deferral, the desire 
for more immediate consummation and the deflation or frustration of 
desire, in a simultaneous movement that constitutes the subject’s rela-
tion both to a divine transcendental realm, and to the bathetic order of 
human erotic love. As such, Patmore’s odes think further what remains 
a stubborn conundrum for Hegel’s aesthetics: the rhythmical potential 
of the caesura for a modern verse that no longer operated according to 
quantitative principles. The poet’s late output does not simply “refute” 
the regularity that the Essay would at times wish to impose. Rather, 
the ghost of regulated order endures even in silence, where it comes 
into tension with the vocal impulse to speak, and hence to abolish law. 
I take this general truth to apply to all nominally “free verse,” but it 
operates particularly acutely in Patmore’s verse, given his competing 
devotional, political and prosodic conceptions of order.
The Unknown Eros does not achieve all this right from the start. The 
first of the sequence’s two books is comparatively conventional, both 
in the manner in which it manipulates the resources of the irregular 
English ode (however much Patmore would resist that designation), 
and in the extent to which it strives to procure those formal devices 
for a stable and recognizable poetic persona. Yet even here it stands 
in a dynamic relation to Patmore’s prosodic theory—not least in the 
way in which it manipulates sustained catalexis so as to render even 
the silent or paused voice palpable. An early poem entitled “The Day 
After Tomorrow” utilizes a lexicon of pauses and beats so frequently 
that we are hard pressed not to read it in direct conversation with 
the Essay itself:
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But shall I not, with ne’er a sign, perceive,
Whilst her sweet hands I hold,
The myriad threads and meshes manifold
Which Love shall round her weave:
The pulse in that vein making alien pause
And varying beats from this;
Down each long finger felt, a differing strand
Of silvery welcome bland;
And in her breezy palm
And silken wrist,
Beneath the touch of my like numerous bliss
Complexly kiss’d,
A diverse and distinguishable calm?
     (P, 357)
If ever proof were needed that internal variation constituted the life 
of meter, it is here, in a passage that first reveals the frank eroticism of 
Patmore’s handling of the line. The alternation between extended lines 
of triple measure (lines 29, 31) and pronounced catalexis (lines 28, 30) 
produces a chain of “varying beats,” whose actuated or non-actuated 
status is less a matter of “real” or “imagined” stress, than a realization 
of the desire that comes from the subject, and that is mediated by 
the other. Patmore fights to unify these “beats” or “pulses,” without 
destroying their radical singularity; to make the “alien pause,” which 
bears such an interesting relation to his Essay, part of “[a] diverse 
and distinguishable calm.” We might well be tempted to desecrate 
that pause or calm, by hurrying through the increasingly breathless 
elaboration of the lover’s body (“And silken wrist”), were it not for 
Patmore having already deployed extreme end-stopped catalexis as a 
declarative statement of certainty, to enforce pause: “Tell her I come;” 
and “We know.” (P, 357).
Other early poems in the sequence similarly all seek to turn nega-
tion into a positive quality, through a virtuosic handling of the verse 
line that further evoke the natural patterns that constitute the recur-
ring addressee (titles such as “Saint Valentines Day,” “Winter,” and 
“Wind and Wave” already suggest periodic returns). “The Day After 
Tomorrow” is like all these things, insofar as it suggests a temporality 
subject to absence; yet it pushes this absence further than anything 
that the more proximate tomorrow could ever hope to possess. The 
pleasure in waiting battles against the pleasure from making the 
awaited one come. As such, Patmore’s vocal address comes increasingly 
to suggest not only those conventional phenomena that generically 
indicate the passage of time, but also a more singular (if still vague) 
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real erotic presence, a “she” who stands behind the “heaving Sea” (P, 
356), “blazing photosphere of central night” (P, 358), and various other 
scattered figures. The poem therefore struggles between a mastery 
of absence through a stated law of eternal return (“It all has been 
before” [P, 357]), and a present-tense longing that would disrupt all 
such ordered procession, as the speaker beseeches “Life” to “[p]erturb 
my golden patience not with joy” (P, 358).
Perhaps it is for this reason that “The Day after Tomorrow” ends 
by taking refuge in a host of personifications (“O Life, Death, Terror, 
Love!” [P, 358]); and that the following series of odes, while redirecting 
Patmore’s invocations to a consistent female subject, also redirects them 
into a prior temporality of controlled regret. “Tristitia,” “The Azalea,” 
“Departure,” “Eurydice,” “The Toys,” and “Tired Memory” are all, as 
several of the titles directly or indirectly suggest, poems of backward 
turning, to a lover or other since departed. “The Azalea”—the poem 
from which we had seen Patmore quote, in his defense to Hopkins of 
womanly “vanity”—recounts a dream in which the subject’s beloved 
was dead; the subject awakens to his relief, “[p]erfectly bless’d in the 
delicious sphere / By which I knew that she was near” (P, 362); yet 
then awakens again from what he had only taken to be waking reality, 
“and she was dead!” (P, 362). There is an overbearing pathos to this 
tale, given that the speaker had gone to bed clutching a letter bearing 
the now-familiar claim, “Sweet to myself that am so sweet to you!” 
(P, 362). Yet so too does this letter insinuate a perhaps more disturbing 
state of affairs: that even in absence (the absence of mediated desire, 
the absence intrinsic to the act of letter-writing, the absence even of 
death), the beloved can be recalled or called up in a manner more 
tangible than what passes for immediate presence.
The very title of “Eurydice” might well represent an acknowledg-
ment of this predicament. But it is “Tired Memory” that provides 
book 1’s most sustained treatment of desire in abeyance. Once again, 
Patmore’s mega-catalexis serves at first to underscore a temporal order, 
the finality of death:
At last, then, thou wast dead.
Yet would I not despair,
But wrought my daily task, and daily said
Many and many a fond, unfeeling prayer,
To keep my vows of faith to thee from harm.
In vain.
                      (P, 366)
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There is a perversity of feeling here that underlies what might pass 
for somewhat mawkish simplicity (“Yet would I not despair”). For the 
subject counters bereavement not through cathartic mourning, but 
rather with prayers that somehow manage to be at once “fond” yet 
“unfeeling”; the following line then suggests that it is not the departed 
beloved, so much as the “vows of faith,” that constitute the speaker’s 
principal concern. The catalectic “In vain.” brutally unmasks such an 
endeavor, abruptly disappointing the rhyme-pattern that had appeared 
to win hope from suffering (“dead” becoming “said,” “despair” finding 
“prayer”), its subsequent, extended silence both representing and 
enforcing the time that cannot be undone. (It is worth remarking here, 
that where Patmore’s Essay considers rhyme as a privileged means of 
enforcing pause, this brutally enforced silence comes about precisely 
through sonorous disjunction.) The “vanity” that Patmore’s poetic 
and aphoristic writing had celebrated in woman, much to Hopkins’s 
unease, here resounds in altered form, transformed by the vulgar pun 
into futility.
Yet there is a world of difference between this definitive, end-
stopped pause and Patmore’s ensuing use of his signature device. 
The bereaved speaker, having come to see that the merely dutiful act 
of remembrance holds no succor (“The wilful faith, which has no joy 
or pain” [P, 367]), undergoes a remarkable change in his patterns of 
worship. Kneeling in a church at Easter,
It came to me to say:
‘Though there is no intelligible rest,
In Earth or Heaven,
For me, but on her breast,
I yield her up, again to have her given,
Or not, as, Lord, Thou wilt, and that for aye.’
And the same night, in slumber lying,
I, who had dream’d of thee as sad and sick and dying,
And only so, nightly for all one year,
Did thee, my own most Dear,
Possess,
In gay celestial beauty nothing coy,
And felt thy soft caress
With heretofore unknown reality of joy.
                         (P, 367)
It is surely a contentious bargain, to agree to “yield” a wife already 
departed, in the hope that the Lord who receives her might in turn 
return her—however much the enjambed “Or not, as, Lord, Thou 
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wilt” confesses His utter authority. Once again Patmore’s spiritual and 
erotic dynamics intersect in a manner whose degree of contentiousness 
depends upon the doctrinal affiliation of whoever is judging: this act of 
relinquishment, which might just about conceivably be a self-abasement 
before God’s domain, also has at least a tint of the erotic yielding that 
is either pleasurable in itself, or which hopes for deferred and thus 
still greater gratification. Just as Patmore’s remodeling of Plato’s cave 
myth moves from shadow to ideality back to shadow, so this dialectic of 
abandonment moves from the tangible (“on her breast”), to the imma-
terial (“I yield her up”), back to the tangible (“soft caress”). Precisely 
how much this possession suggests a profane eroticism all the stranger 
for the beloved being irredeemable in any real sense, or a retrieval of 
feeling memory made possible by the grace of God, will again depend 
on the reader’s persuasion. But in either case, where the previous 
catalexis (“In vain”) enforced definitive finality, “Possess,” makes the 
vocal space that follows it vibrate with palpability, in much the same 
way as the departed lover’s absent body. Taking it as a complete unit 
(the unitary line that forms so essential a component of Patmore’s 
prosody), we forget the past tense of the qualifying clause, bestowing 
upon it the priority of the present.
It is perhaps the disturbing charge of such visions that causes 
Patmore abruptly to change course for the remainder of book 1, 
and seek refuge in a series of more public odes whose reactionary 
politics—whether inveighing against the 1867 reform act, Benjamin 
Disraeli’s marriage of “false English Nobles and their Jew” (P, 370) or 
the settlement of the Alabama claims—remains, frankly, shocking. It 
could well be that in these poems Patmore continues to manipulate 
the varied verse line in a virtuosic fashion, though for my part I confess 
that I am unable to see beyond the abruptly rabid tone. Yet the eroti-
cism that book 1 attempted to get out of its system only returns in still 
bolder form, in the first ode of the second volume, the eponymous 
“To the Unknown Eros.”
Such a shift arises through Patmore’s verse technique, which pushes 
an established repertoire further and harder than anything yet seen:
What rumour’d heavens are these
Which not a poet sings,
O, Unknown Eros? What this breeze
Of sudden wings
Speeding at far returns of time from interstellar space
To fan my very face,
And gone as fleet,
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Through delicatest ether feathering soft their solitary beat,
With ne’er a light plume dropp’d, nor any trace
To speak of whence they came or whither they depart?
      (P, 392)
There is a newfound plenitude to Patmore’s non-catalectic lines here, 
which resembles Hopkins in its alternation of polysyllables and mono-
syllables to create a sense of easeful propulsion (“Through delicatest 
ether feathering soft their solitary beat”). The extension of lines 5, 
8 and 10 runs up against an element that is, however, seldom to be 
found in Hopkins’s output, the catalexis that has become familiar, but 
which now communicates an unprecedented tension and release. The 
complete lines “Of sudden wings,” “And gone as fleet” burst suddenly 
into being, before rendering the voice mute as they depart: the fact 
that both “wings” and “fleet” form answering rhymes chains us to the 
fullness of the line, while depriving us of the elusive force that briefly 
flew into view.
The speaker of book 1 continually shied away from an investment 
of the departed past so charged as to render it anew. Here, the recol-
lected and the prospective are brought unashamedly and intimately 
together, through a daring rescripting of William Wordsworth’s “Ode 
(‘Intimations of Immortality from Recollections of Early Childhood’)”:
And why this palpitating heart,
This blind and unrelated joy,
This meaningless desire,
That moves me like the Child
Who in the flushing darkness troubled lies,
Inventing lonely prophecies,
Which even to his Mother mild
He dares not tell:
To which himself is infidel;
His heart not less on fire
With dreams impossible as wildest Arab Tale,
(So thinks the boy,)
With dreams that turn him red and pale,
Yet less impossible and wild
Than those which bashful Love, in his own way and hour,
Shall duly bring to flower?
                   (P, 392)
If Love is indeed “bashful,” it has a funny way of showing it, in this 
most vocally and declaratively sensuous of passages. That sensuous-
ness exists not only at the level of imagery and the varied pauses that 
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have formed so great a part of my readings to date, but also through 
a series of rhymes with which Patmore takes far greater liberties than 
anything on offer in book 1. Those prior poems naturally varied acoustic 
patterns, in a manner perfectly permissible for the irregular ode; but 
here, “unrelated joy” stands as an appropriately unanswered singular. 
We might think a similar fate has befallen the apparently equivalent 
state of “meaningless desire,” where once again no immediate rhyme 
is forthcoming; the trace of the word has almost faded by the stage we 
get to “less on fire,” a full seven lines later, in another proof through 
a different medium of the strength of delayed gratification. “To the 
Unknown Eros” continues to push rhyme’s natural capacity for (erotic) 
invitation and completion still further: tempting us to draw “wild” away 
from its true-rhyme (“Mother mild”) into the verbal ambit of the more 
proximate “fire”; and later fusing together the “fire” rhyme that had 
been staggered (“Thou art not Amor; or if so, yon pyre, / That waits 
the willing victim flames with vestal fire” [P, 393]), in a quickening 
cycle of amorous conflagration.
Where Wordsworth can appeal implicitly to a broader Neo-Platonism, 
so as to justify his belief that the newborn child knows more of the 
soul than the adult self that succeeds it, Patmore therefore makes that 
knowledge both frankly erotic and, with striking candor, grounded in 
singular experience. This child’s intimation similarly turns out to be the 
aptest “prophes[y]” of all, not because it anticipates the erotic life to 
come in an accurate manner, but rather because its total incapacity to 
seize the excessiveness of desire tells us more about desire than those 
later versions of ourselves (those versions that “know better”) ever can. 
But if book 2 can finally bring itself to admit the desire that constituted 
those prior poems all along, so does it raise the disconcerting question 
of how such erotic impulse can possibly accommodate itself not only to 
correct devotional practice, but also to any even half-orderly prosody. 
It is not hard to perceive how such energy might threaten even the 
more embodied and dynamic account of meter that I have attempted 
to claim Patmore’s prosodic theory provided. Just how could the heart 
on fire accommodate itself to law of any kind?
The question as to how we should read the odes in light of Patmore’s 
Essay has, despite its obviousness, seldom been satisfactorily or 
thoroughly answered. Despite spending nearly 130 pages on the ode 
sequence in Victorian Discourses in Sexuality and Religion (by far 
the most comprehensive critical treatment to date), John Maynard 
says nothing about how the erotic content whose pervasiveness he 
correctly identifies relates to the metrical novelty of Patmore’s verse. 
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Joseph Phelan, by contrast, does attend to the metrical character of the 
sequence, which he reads in perfect conformity with (what he takes to 
be) Patmore’s prosodic theory. “Perhaps because of its metrical idio-
syncrasy,” Phelan contends, “The Unknown Eros has not achieved the 
recognition it deserves, as one of the most majestic poetic collections 
issued during the second half of the nineteenth century. Read in line 
with Patmore’s theories, the poems are often excruciatingly slow to read, 
but do unquestioningly possess what Patmore calls ‘high and stately 
lyrical feeling.’”44 It is difficult to know on what evidence this claim 
rests, and how, more generally, the platitude of “stately lyrical feeling” 
(whatever that really means) can ever be protected from excruciating 
declamation. We might here recall Patmore’s own admission in the 
Essay that the excessive pause renders both vocal expedients (ignoring 
it, or realizing it) equally “absurd” (E, 26–27). I myself have tried the 
experiment that Phelan recommends on more than one occasion, 
with a group of students: the embarrassment that proceeded was in 
my opinion fatal to conventional lyric propriety. (That embarrassment 
was certainly not restricted to my students.)
By calling the excessive pause fatal to propriety, I do not mean that it 
simply dissolves lyric aspiration into bathos. Indeed, it does something 
far more interesting and novel than that. But to witness that novelty, 
we have to look more closely at the range of Patmore’s verse technique. 
Phelan clinches his claim that the catalexis, while “excruciating,” is 
appropriate both to lyric register and to the Essay more broadly, by 
reading a single poem from book 1 that I mentioned only in passing, 
“Departure.” Here again we find the familiar mega-catalexis:
It was not like your great and gracious ways!
Do you that have nought other to lament,
Never, my love, repent
Of how, that July afternoon,
You went,
With sudden unintelligible phrase,
And frightened eye[.]
                       (P, 363)
“In the case of the momentous line ‘You went,’” Phelan continues, 
“there is a pause of the full fourteen syllables allowed for in Patmore’s 
theory; the mimetic appropriateness of this painfully distended pause 
for the speaker’s speechless and disbelieving guilt is self-evident.”45 
Now, I am in full agreement that we can indeed read the catalectic line 
as Phelan suggests, with a protracted pause, and that this protracted 
pause is appropriate to the domestic drama of the poem more generally. 
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(I do not much care whether we can make the strong claim of adher-
ence to “Patmore’s theory,” whether we need to specify the duration 
of this pause as 14 syllables—it is enough that we can speak in the 
approximate language of the short, the long and the very long.)
The crucial fault within Phelan’s argument, however, is that it uses 
a singular instance (“You went”) to advance a general thesis (that The 
Unknown Eros can be read in perfect conformity with the Essay). 
Yet as that ode sequence progresses, it is increasingly clear that the 
catalexis produces a more complex and wider range of effects, not (it is 
important to repeat) to “refute” that theory, but to apply a productive 
pressure that reveals its possibilities. The justification for reading “You 
went” is, as Phelan says, mimetic: the pause equates to and enforces 
the departure of the beloved. I have highlighted other such uses of 
similar mimetic pauses above (for example, “In vain.”). Even the 
truncated “Possess” can be seen to perform similar work, albeit that 
its palpability functions in a slightly different manner, threatening to 
possess and thereby to disarm the pause that succeeds it.
But “To the Unknown Eros” (to return to the matter in hand) 
muddies the issue yet further. It is one thing to read the early catelectc 
pauses (“Of sudden wings,” “And gone as fleet”), which communicate 
sheer speed yet also a sense of abandonment comparable to “You 
went.” It is quite another to encounter the later, fuller catalexis of the 
poem’s middle section:
What in its ruddy orbit lifts the blood,
Like a perturbed moon of Uranus,
Reaching to some great world in ungauged darkness hid;
And whence
This rapture of the sense
Which, by thy whisper bid,
Reveres with obscure rite and sacramental sign
A bond I know not of nor dimly can divine;
      (P, 393)
Phelan’s mimetic justification can hardly be wheeled out in support of 
“And whence,” which is no less momentous than “You went,” despite 
(or because of) its lack of decisive narrative content. Where the latter 
example enforces separation, “And whence” no less forcefully seeks 
continuance, through a whole host of properties: through featuring a 
directional preposition (“whence”), through being one of the countless 
rhetorical questions whose answer is no sooner sought than a similar 
variant is posed, through not being end-stopped by any punctuation at 
all, through being the invitation and not the response to rhyme, where 
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even Patmore’s Essay acknowledges that the latter most effectively 
marks the pause (E, 31). For all these accumulated reasons, it is simply 
ludicrous to think that any reader of whatever level of erudition can 
simply effect an extended pause, without a force tugging them (as 
Eros tugs the speaker) to the following line.
But this does not simply mean that we simply have to realize 
different catalexis differently, to pause at some while breathlessly 
enjambing others. The significance of “And whence” is not that we 
need quickly to dispose of it, but that the reader’s voice is caught 
between the internalized need to pause appropriately, as if in obedi-
ence to some external law, and to rush forward into the gratification 
of continuance: and this dilemma constitutes the crux of Patmore’s 
erotic and devotional body. It might be objected at this point that by 
retaining even this intimation of a disobeyed law, I am preserving too 
much of the normative force of Patmore’s Essay; that most readers are 
fortunate enough not to come to a poem with the whole weight of the 
nineteenth century prosodic debates hanging on their shoulders. This 
is indeed true: but even in that bliss of ignorance, a countervailing 
force to the free discharge of vocal energy is, I think, demonstrably 
present. We cannot get to the unenforceable pause of “And whence” 
without first having read the more performable pauses of the same 
poem’s opening. The disruptive force of the former therefore exists 
only through some form of intuited “law,” however inexact; a law that 
covers not only the singular poem but also (for those more diligent 
readers who still read whole sequences in order) The Unknown Eros 
to this point. And this truth extends yet further: in reality, even the 
most immediate or naïve reader does not approach the single poem 
or sequence in isolation. Even in an unmetrical age such as our own, 
poetry as a conventional form of social expression sets up numerous 
expectations: chief among them is (still, just about) the expectation that 
the line itself has a particular if indefinable valence, that the marked 
curtailment of that line does not amount to nothing. In the discovery 
that even the self-asserting liberty of free verse can exist only under 
condition of violating a deep-seated law that paradoxically needs to 
remain in place (to be violated ever anew), we approach the language 
of Patmore’s own Essay, and glimpse once again the counter-intuitively 
radical potential that it has always held.
Several other odes from book 2 develop Patmore’s theologico-corpo-
real thinking in distinct manners, as their titles (“Sponsa Dei,” “To the 
Body,” “Eros and Psyche” already suggest). Yet I wish to conclude this 
essay in a more eccentric fashion, by focusing upon a small document 
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that is unknown in a rather different manner to The Unknown Eros. 
It takes the form of a 1933 letter from Richard de Bary, a prolific 
Catholic author and acquaintance of Patmore, to Julian Huxley, the 
evolutionary biologist and brother of Aldous Huxley. Having recently 
attended the latter’s talk on “Tissue Culture and Human Habits,” 
de Bary writes on 5 June with news of a past “discovery” made by 
Coventry Patmore, who is strikingly described as “a pioneer student 
of sex,” who “was worried with nerve trouble.”46 De Bary elaborates 
upon the theme in a further letter on 13 June, in a handwriting that 
is at times difficult to decipher:
He discovered that if there were an absolutely perfect closure (by silk-
thread if you will) of the sex-organ, and coitus attempted; the entire 
output of spermatozoa [“broke”?] into the nerve system of the emitter 
and effect entire “nerve-regeneration.” The reason why this has not 
otherwise been discovered is because it requires one particular rather 
vehement act to bring it about; and what C. P. described as the act of 
a “severing sword.”47
Given de Bary’s rather euphemistic locution (although it is quite a 
surprise that he could bring himself to be this frank), it is difficult to 
know precisely what this mysterious “severing sword” comprised. But it 
seems fairly clear—from de Bary’s subsequent reference to “‘injacula-
tion’ instead of ‘ejaculation’,” and the claim that such an act could be 
considered typically Victorian only insofar as it shunned “waste”—that 
it formed something like the common Taoist practice, where ejacula-
tion is deferred or denied entirely, so as to introduce semen into the 
blood supply.48 (Curious readers should know that modern science 
refutes such a hypothesis.)
De Bary claims to have learned of this “discovery” from “one who 
knew Coventry Patmore perfectly,” a claim whose reliability cannot 
be proven, but which would seem a little far-fetched to fabricate.49 
He attributes Patmore’s reticence on the subject to a Victorian culture 
whose unforgiving tendencies were already clearer in retrospect. 
Interestingly, however, de Bary states that “he buried his discovery”; 
the unnamed friend assures him that Patmore’s “meanings were not 
‘mystical’ but ‘physiological’,” and de Bary himself states, in his second 
letter on 13 June, that “[a]fter the discovery referred to he wrote To 
the Unknown Eros & 5 or 6 Odes including The Open Secret.”50 While 
Patmore is alleged to refer directly to “coitus,” de Bary freely admits to 
have attempted the same “act” in masturbation, and to have achieved 
“entire . . .nerve regeneration”!51
869Ewan Jones
While I intend this curious set of letters to clinch the argument 
that I have been attempting throughout, so too do I intend it to clarify 
precisely what that argument does and does not entail. For it might 
well be tempting to reduce Patmore’s verse body to the pleasurable or 
controlled real body, to collapse his devotional language into a codified 
discourse of erotic desire, as de Bary’s emphases of “Unknown” and 
“Open Secret” encourage us to do. Yet this is a temptation that—if the 
reader will forgive the loaded phrasing—we would do well to resist, 
for it would merely reproduce what I have earlier described as the 
crass identification of bodily experience with the immediately mani-
fest. Patmore’s writing strives throughout to resist the parceling-out of 
experience into the profane and the devotional spheres, because both 
proceed through the complex interplay of abstraction and palpability, 
gratification and deferral. The more Patmore’s body approaches the 
real, human, profane embarrassed body, the more it paradoxically 
intuits man’s relationship to an unknowable yet sensuous beyond. Such 
a form of worship may not, needless to say, be to everyone’s devotional 
taste. It nevertheless distinguishes Patmore as one of the most idio-
syncratic, perverse, profound, and unrecognized poets of the body to 
which the English language can lay claim. He was no member of the 
Fleshly School, not because he was unfleshly but because it is difficult 
to imagine any school ever forming around this body.
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